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Abstract
A model has been developed to study the interdependence between a firm’s choice of
information technology and degree of integration, and the structure of its industry.
Advances in information technology might provide incentives for a firm to specialize or
focus on its core competence. However, the success of its specialization strategy depends on
the extent of industry-level specialization, which is, in turn, the result of the behavior of
individual firms and their adoption of information technology favoring specialization.
Electronic markets and industries have been chosen as an application domain, as they
would not even exist without information technology. Furthermore, they are very dynamic
emerging industries with rapidly changing structures.© 1999, 2000 CSL/CEF2k0601.doc/06/01/00 2
1 Research Problem: Information Technology and Industry Structure
Evolution
The literature suggests that over time industry structure evolves from industry-level integration
to industry-level specialization (i.e., Chandler 1990, Arora et al. 1997/98). Initially, firms and
industries tend to be integrated.
1 At an early stage of an industry, the option to “make or buy”
items unique to that industry is most likely reduced to “make”, because a “buy” alternative
may simply not exist. For one, suppliers may not exist. For another, too few suppliers could
use their market power to make inputs prohibitively expensive or refuse to sell inputs at all.
Theses coordination problems are known as the small numbers bargaining problem and market
foreclosure respectively (e.g., Whinston 1990, Ordover 1990). In 1913, Ford was nearly 100%
vertically integrated, producing almost all of its inputs. Over time, firms and industries appear
to become more specialized.
2 Today, automakers typically provide only 30%-40% of a car’s
value added (Womack et al. 1990, 33-35). A similar observation has been made for digital
interactive services such as consumer online services (Schlueter-Langdon 1999). The only
providers that survived the early 1990s infancy stage were highly vertically integrated (e.g.,
America Online, CompuServe and Germany’s BTX/T-Online). The ones that failed—even
before the Web became popular—were far less integrated (e.g., Delphi, eWorld and Europe
Online).
Across industries, firms have to understand the dynamics of industry evolution to make
appropriate decisions on the scope of business activities—the degree of integration—and
choice of technology to support these activities. This is particularly important for entrants.
Once a market and strategic position have been identified, decisions on the scope of activities
and choice of technology become the foundation and skeleton of any financial business plan.
This must be done before moving on to specify implementation issues, such as a business
process design and marketing planning.
This paper aims to investigate the dynamics of industry structure evolution by analyzing the
impact of information technology and selected market structure variables on the success of
specialization strategies. Specifically, we try to analyze how the performance of specialized
firms is effected by its choice of information technology and the degree of industry-level
integration.
3
                                                
1 Perry describes a firm as vertically integrated if “it encompasses two single-output production processes in
which either (1) the entire output of the “upstream” process is employed as part or all of the quantity of one
intermediate input into the “downstream” process, or (2) the entire quantity of one intermediate input into the
“downstream” process is obtained from part or all of the output of the “upstream” process” (1989, 185). This
notion of vertical integration rules out the case in which some of the output of the upstream process is employed
as some of the input in the downstream process. “Vertical integration also means the ownership and complete
control over neighboring stages of production or distribution” (Perry 1989, 186).
2 Specialization, it should be noted, should not be confused with size; automakers, for example, are becoming
more specialized as they outsource manufacturing and assembly to suppliers while at the same time becoming
bigger by merging with competitors.
3 “The vertical organization of industry is an important topic that has not received its due attention. There has
been a great deal of work on vertical ownership but not on [the competitive characteristics of “open” and “closed”
forms of industry organization and their welfare implications]” (Farrell et al. 1998, 170-171). The authors define
“open” as a “regime when firms add one stage of value and put the results back in the market, rather than
controlling a longer segment of the value chain” (150). This definition is compatible with the one for industry-
level specialization as used here.© 1999, 2000 CSL/CEF2k0601.doc/06/01/00 3
This decision problem is very obvious in the area of digital interactive services, such as Web
portals (i.e., Yahoo!) and electronic commerce providers (i.e., Amazon). These emerging
industries would not even exist without new digital information technology (IT), such as the
Internet and Web protocols (i.e., TCP/IP, HTTP, HTML, URL) and related software
applications (i.e., NCSA Mosaic Web browser and HTTPd server).
From the perspective of an entrant such as a start-up, specialization is a preferable choice for
several reasons. First, integrated entry is usually very expensive, and, if not achieved through a
single merger or acquisition, but rather many small steps it can be also very time-consuming.
Second, an integrated entrant would be exposed to competition along many processes, while a
specialized entrant could focus on a smaller set of activities. In the area of online and Web
services, only Microsoft’s MSN (Microsoft Network) tried to compete head on with America
Online. Others chose to focus on specific areas only (i.e., Yahoo!’s directory and search,
GeoCities’ online communities of interest and chat, Uunet’s Internet access service).
The trend toward industry-level specialization or open structures is facilitated by technological
progress and specifically by the emergence of standards. Many industry studies suggest that the
emergence of standards or modular design coincidences with an increase in the number of
specialized producers.
4 Once equipment can be broken into components, production processes
can be separated and reorganized to better facilitate the division of labor. Instead of building
cars by making and assembling all its pieces in one place, today, parts (disks) are
manufactured worldwide and assembled into components (disk brake), which are build into
systems (axle complete with suspension and brakes), which in turn are finally assembled into a
car. As companies wish to focus on those sets of components and related skills that they
consider to be their core competence, ownership may be divided as well (Pralahad and Hamel
1990).
5 Thus firms become more specialized and the industry as a whole opens up. As the
division of labor implies trade between specialized agents, benefits of specialization for any
agent also depend on the efficiency of trade or market transactions between agents. Research
has revealed that IT, in particular, has the potential to significantly lower transaction cost,
making market coordination less costly than hierarchy (Malone 1987, Table 1, 485), thereby
providing further incentives for specialization.
While specialization appears to be a viable strategy in a highly specialized industry and
vertical integration an appropriate strategy in a highly integrated industry, choices become less
obvious for situations in between. There are several complications.
Firstly, specialization is only a choice if it is technologically possible, which may not be
obvious. Information technology presents itself as a steady stream of promising product
announcements every day. Only time and trials reveal which one has the potential to emerge as
a standard. Although the Web protocols (HTTP, HTML, URL) have already been invented in
1990 it took more than five years for them to evolve as popular standards (www.w3.org;
                                                
4 An overview of recent case studies is provided by Arora et al. (1997/98). The example of the computer industry
is discussed in Farrell et al. (1998, 144-145).
5 According to a Harbour & Associates study, Detroit’s Big Three have significantly reduced in-house production.
Ford and Chrysler, for example, have even outsourced the production of brakes entirely (“Make It of Buy It?”
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www.merit.edu).
Secondly, specialization should potentially be more successful—profitable—than vertical
integration. Success could depend on the potential cost advantages from specialization over
vertical integration, such as lower fixed and variable production cost, as well as lower
transaction cost between specialized agents. Just as with standards, only time and trials
typically reveal the profit impact of new software applications. Many Web start-ups, for
example, remain unprofitable despite being in business for a couple of years already.
Thirdly, it may take others to release the cost savings potential of specialization, or, in other
words, it depends on industry-level conditions. This is obvious in a situation where all
incumbents are vertically integrated. Without suppliers, a firm cannot specialize. The firm
would have to create its own suppliers and competitive markets for inputs, which appears to be
quite challenging for a single firm. If two firms would simultaneously decide to break up
vertically into two firms each, then they could immediately create two competing suppliers.
Therefore, from the perspective of an individual firm, its decision to adopt technology to
specialize depends on the behavior of other firms. In other words, individual decisions depend
on industry-level conditions, which, in turn, are the result of the collective behavior of firms.
Fourthly, as new information technology is introduced continuously, the viable degree of
specialization is also constantly shifting. While an industry’s history may reveal a clear path
toward specialization its extension into the future is difficult to predict. In order to make better
decisions it would be helpful to understand the dynamics of industry evolution.
2 The Model
2.1 Research Question and Hypotheses
In order to analyze the dynamics of IT-enabled industry structure evolution we investigate the
choice of specialization strategies. Specifically, we ask what strategy should an entrant adopt
with regards to choice of information technology and degree of integration?
The subject of our analysis is, therefore, a specialized firm.
6 The dependent variable is the
specialized firm’s profit. Among the four independent variables are two firm-level variables
and two industry structure variables. The firm-level variables include (1) choice of information
technology and (2) degree of integration. The industry structure variables are (3) number of
firms in the industry and (4) the degree of industry-level integration.
In order to keep the research problem simple, values for each of the aforementioned variables
have been simplified.
                                                
6 The objective is not to optimize the performance of the entire production system—global performance—which
may not maximize each firm’s performance—local performance. In Farrell et al.’s model, for example,
specialization throughout the supply chain or “open” interaction leads to the socially optimal outcome because it
minimizes costs (1998). As a firm’s profit is not only determined by cost the socially efficient choice does not
need to be the most profitable. In their model and specifically in the case of Bertrand competition, cost
heterogeneity drives industry profits, which in turn provides firms with a joint incentive to create a structure that
maximizes cost heterogeneity and not necessarily minimizes cost.© 1999, 2000 CSL/CEF2k0601.doc/06/01/00 5
Choice of Information Technology.  Only two information technology alternatives are
distinguished: “old” versus “new”. “Old” information technology is understood as monolithic,
proprietary platforms or dedicated, standalone systems with very high fixed cost and low
variable cost. “New” information systems are considered modular and compatible with
moderate fixed and variable cost. In the area of digital interactive services information systems
have evolved from proprietary client-server systems, such as the America Online information
system, to open and compatible component technology, such as the Web protocols, browser
and server. The arrival of the latter made it possible for many firms to enter digital interactive
services markets such as Yahoo!, Excite and Lycos.
Degree of Integration.  Firms can either be specialized on one stage of a production system or
integrated across two stages. Integration is limited to 100% integration. In other words, if a
firm is integrated across two sequential production stages it produces only and all the inputs it
needs for its downstream stage.
Number of Firms and Industry-level Integration.  There are only two industry scenarios: (1) a
closed or integrated industry with few but mostly integrated firms (Ii) and (2) an open or
specialized industry with many and mostly specialized firms (Is).
This selection of variables and range of values creates a matrix of four different
situations/settings as depicted in Table 1.
IT Options Industry/Supply Chain
Structure Scenario “Old” IT “New” IT
Integrated and Few Firms
(Ii; most firms are integrated,
few suppliers)
H1: Being integrated is more
successful (profitable) than
specialization.
Specialized and Many Firms
(Is; most firms are
specialized, many suppliers)
H2: Being specialized is more
successful than integration.
Table 1: Overview of Settings and Research Hypotheses
For now, two settings have been chosen with one hypothesis each: H1 for the scenario of
industry-level integration and “old” IT. H2 for industry-level specialization and availability of
“new” IT.
Having specified the research problem and stated the research hypotheses, the following
section will denote how the characteristics of the research problem have been modeled in order
to test the research hypotheses.
2.2 Supply Chain Modeling and Simulation
Two models could be found that address the dynamics of industry evolution (Arora et al.
1997/98, Farrell et al. 1998). Both models investigate the process of vertical integration and
disintegration. They differ in that Arora et al. “explicitly investigates the dynamics of industry
structure evolution in a competitive market setting, albeit with boundedly rational firms”
(Arora et al. 1997/98, 3), while Farrell et al. consider strategic interaction (Bertrand and
Cournot competition).
In order to investigate the dynamics of an entire industry with multiple business segments, the© 1999, 2000 CSL/CEF2k0601.doc/06/01/00 6
use of simulation experiments is viewed as a promising approach.
7
2.3 Conceptual Model
In order to model the research problem of an optimal entry strategy, the following key
components need to be incorporated: (1) an industry, (2) firms, and (3) a supply chain. Also,
the following issues have to be addressed: How to recognize or differentiate (1) the structure
of a firm, (2) states of IT, and (3) industry-level feedback.
In the model, an industry is conceptualized as being composed of firms, with similar firms
representing a business segment, such as manufacturers and retailers. Firms are composed of at
least one business process, which, in turn, is comprised of production and cost functions. A
supply chain defines the order of the main business processes or, in other words, the
successive stages of value-added.
Combining different processes creates firms with different structures. A firm with one process
is considered specialized, while a firm composed of a combination of processes is referred to
as an integrated one. Different states of IT are reflected in the shape of cost functions (CFIX,
cVAR), which are embedded in a business process.
The industry-level feedback mechanism is achieved by coordinating the interaction of firms
along the value chain through markets. Therefore, each firm is at the same time a buyer of
inputs and a seller of outputs.
In order to identify viable entry strategies, the success of different types of firms at the same
stage in the supply chain has to be studied. The performance of an individual firm within a
supply chain configuration is measured by its profits, which are derived by subtracting cost of
inputs and production from revenues made by selling output to the firm’s most downstream
market. Due to market coordination of production activities, the performance of each firm, as
well as system performance, is the result of the collective behavior of many agents, as opposed
to more traditional approaches—in particular, neoclassic economic models that follow a top-
down design with aggregate demand and supply functions representing an economic system.
2.4 Complex Adaptive System Architecture
2.4.1 Multi-Agent System and Enterprise Integration Modeling
The conceptual model has been implemented as a multi-agent system (MAS). Its design
process has benefited from the application of a formal multi-agent framework of coordination
in enterprise integration developed by Sikora and Shaw (1996) and from Holland’s complex
adaptive system (CAS) modeling methods (1995, 10–40).
The architecture of the MAS model shares characteristics of enterprise integration models,
8
such as multiple level abstraction in representing organizational structures, communication
                                                
7 Chaturvedi and Mehta, for example, suggest to use agent-based simulation models as “that for an even
moderately complex economic model, there is very little hope of actually solving the problem” (1999, 60). See
also Rust (1996).
8 Lin, Tan, and Shaw provide a brief overview of selected, more recent enterprise integration models (1996, 3-4).© 1999, 2000 CSL/CEF2k0601.doc/06/01/00 7
between participants via message-passing, and agent adaptability as well as properties of CAS
models, such as flows and aggregation.
Furthermore, the MAS modeling process and, in particular, the implementation of the model
have benefited from two CAS simulations: Lin’s supply chain network application (1996) and
the Anasazi village formation simulator (Kohler and Carr 1996). Lin’s model supports the
evaluation of approaches for improving order fulfillment performance in supply chain
networks in manufacturing. Kohler and Carr’s model is utilized in the analysis of the Anasazi
village formation, a prehistoric settlement system in Southwest North America.
9 Both models
have been among the first applications using the Swarm toolkit.
10
2.4.2 Building Blocks, Flows, and Aggregation
Figure 1 provides a high-level overview of the architecture of the MAS model. It represents a
production system or supply chain which can be broken down into three stages of processes
which contribute to the transformation of two types of raw materials into one final good.
                                                
9 While Lin’s simulator resembles complicated process chains, albeit with linear interaction, the Anasazi village
application features simple processes but adaptive behavior instead of linear interaction. This complication can
produce non-linear outcomes, which in turn could allow for the study of emergent behavior such as settlement
formation. In the Anasazi village simulator, the smallest unit of analysis or core agent is not a business
unit/process but a household. It requires inputs (e.g., food, space for living and farming), generates output (corn),
can grow (birth of children) and shrink (death of household member), and engages in trade with other households.
The Anasazi village implementation has been a valuable case example, because it features a primitive exchange
mechanism. Lin’s supply chain network application, in particular, provided insights into the implementation of
multiple layer abstractions utilizing Swarm’s nested inherent hierarchy property.
10 Swarm is a general purpose, multi-agent simulation software platform developed at the Santa Fe Institute. It is
particularly well-suited for the study of complex adaptive systems, since it allows discrete event simulation of
[economic] interactions between heterogeneous agents (firms, markets) and a collective environment (an



























Figure 1: Architecture of the Simulation Model
The final stage of processing requires two intermediate goods, each produced in separate
process strings. These joint process strings are in turn composed of a two-stage sequence of
processes each. This convergent supply chain design is compatible with the high-level
abstraction of a generic value chain for digital interactive services as described in Schlueter
and Shaw (1997).
The supply chain stages are implemented as process agents, each of which is assigned to one
firm or enterprise agent. Enterprise agents of the same stage represent a business segment.
Integration of an enterprise agent into the next stage upstream is achieved by also assigning a
process agent of that stage to the same enterprise agent. If input requirements of the enterprise
agent’s core process can be provided entirely by its upstream process agent, then this
configuration is considered 100% vertically integrated. Please note that firms can currently
only be integrated backwardly; although a 100% backward integrated retailer-type firm (stage
three) would be no different from a 100% forward integrated stage-two-type firm. Any degree
of integration below 100% would make a difference, however.
Enterprise agents interact with each other through market agents. Because each enterprise
agent is a seller of its output and, at the same time, a buyer of inputs required to produce the
output in the first place, market agents facilitate two flows throughout the system: the flow of
goods downstream and revenues upstream.
11 Some of the revenues made from the sale of the
final good downstream are passed on to enterprise agents upstream as a reward or return for
their contribution to the final value added. The share of revenues distributed upstream depends
                                                
11 Flows are one of Holland’s essential characteristics of a complex adaptive system (1995, 23-27, 38).© 1999, 2000 CSL/CEF2k0601.doc/06/01/00 9
on conditions with local markets such as the number of buyers and sellers. This decentralized
credit-passing scheme provides performance incentives throughout the entire system (i.e.,
Holland 1995, 42 and 53-60). Backward integration reduces an enterprise agent’s dependence
on upstream market conditions. As illustrated in Figure 1, 100% backward integration would
allow bypassing of an upstream market altogether.
Figure 1 also reveals an important design method called building blocks (Holland 1995, 34-37;
actual building blocks can be perceived as agents in the context of multi-agent systems). The
method refers to the decomposition of a complex scene into few, distinct categories of
components and relationships. Building blocks can be reused and combined to create relevant,
perpetually novel scenes. With decomposition and repeated use of building blocks, novelty
arises through combination. Even with only a few sets of categories of components or building
blocks and rules for combining them, an exponentially large number of different
configurations can be assembled.
The challenge with building blocks is the decomposition of a complex scene into as few and
most relevant categories of components and rules for combining them—also referred to as
dependencies—as possible. If this can be achieved, building blocks provide great scalability
and efficiency with reconfiguration.
Building blocks become even more powerful when applied to aggregation or tiered designs.
Aggregation “concerns the emergence of complex large-scale behaviors from the aggregate
interactions of less complex agents” (Holland 1995, 11).
12 It is considered a basic characteristic
of all complex adaptive systems. Figure 2 illustrates how aggregation has been achieved
through the nested hierarchies (i.e., enterprise = swarm of processes) and multiple-layer design
(i.e., industry, business segments and enterprises) of the multi-agent system: Different low-
level process agents are combined to form enterprise agents. Similar enterprise agents
aggregate to create different business segments, which in turn represent an industry.
                                                
12 Aggregation corresponds to the concept of sub-agents in Sikora and Shaw’s multi-agent system framework





Business Segment = Swarm of Enterprises





(Future: Process = Swarm of Business Activities)
Industry = Swarm of Business Segments
Source: Adapted from Schlueter, C., and M. J. Shaw.  1998. An Organizational Ecosystems Simulator Applied to Electronic Commerce.
Proceedings of CIST/INFORMS April 1998 Conference held in Montreal, Canada.
Stage 1 Stage 2  Stage 3
Business
Segment
Figure 2: Building Blocks and Aggregation
This design allows for patterns of high-level events to derive from the settings of low-level
building blocks. A change in conditions of process agents, such as an increase in scale
economies, trickles up through higher layers to create some aggregate outcome that can be
observed at the top layer, such as an increase in industry concentration. In other words, higher-
level events, such as changes in industry structures, emerge from lower-level conditions and
dynamics of interaction.
Having introduced the three types of agents—enterprise, process and market agents—and
high-level relationships, the following paragraph takes a look inside each agent and its
dependencies.
2.4.3 Agent Functions and Dependencies
Figure 3—a detail of Figure 1 (agents marked in gray)—reveals how tasks have been
distributed throughout the system. Each agent carries a distinct functional component: FEA =
{Adaptation}, FPA = {Production}, and FMA = {Clearing}.© 1999, 2000 CSL/CEF2k0601.doc/06/01/00 11
Enterprise Agent (EA)
FEA= {Adaptation}




















Figure 3: Building Blocks and Interdependencies
Agents or their embedded functional components are linked with each other through
dependencies. In this multi-agent system, four different links are sufficient to create a multi-
stage supply chain. If one wishes to turn the selected enterprise agent into a backward
integrated firm with production capabilities also in stage 1, then this could be achieved with
the current set of components:  One process agent and three interdependencies would have to
be added as indicated with dotted lines in Figure 3.
The following three paragraphs will explain each of the embedded functions or methods.
Enterprise Agent Activities and Functions
Enterprises are composed of at least one process agent. They plan and manage production,
which is executed by their process agents. Enterprise agents buy non-labor process inputs and
fund production of their process agent(s). Purchasing overhead and SG&A (Selling, General &
Administration) charges are currently not considered. There is no inventory build-up of either
inputs or output; excess supplies and unsold goods are completely written off within one value
creation cycle. (This is a very reasonable assumption as direct supplies and the final products
in DIS markets are usually services, such as an online newspaper.)
In the case of integrated firms, the enterprise agent is comprised of at least two process agents,
internal sourcing is maximized to fully utilize the pre-assigned in-house share (called
InHouseShare in the software code).
Figure 4 illustrates how the InHouseShare variable can be utilized to “dial-in” a particular
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Figure 4: Enterprise Agent—Flexibility of Coordination Mechanism}
As the InHouseShare can vary between ‡ 0% and £ 100%, the entire spectrum of coordination
alternatives between the two extremes of hierarchy and market can be implemented (Coase
1937, Williamson 1975). A hybrid configuration, for example, could be chosen to capture the
impact of a contractual agreement.








EP P E C C C
1
(E-1)
k Number of enterprise processes
nP Most upstream process of the enterprise
CPi Process cost function
CEPi Cost of process inputs
The costs of inputs for each process are given by:
CEP (ti) = dpaP (ti) paP (ti-1)  aP (ti) x1 + dpbP (ti) pbP (ti-1)  bP (ti) x2  +  pgP x3
(E-2)
ti Time step i
paP (ti-1) Unit price of process input a
dpaP (ti) Unit price change of process input a© 1999, 2000 CSL/CEF2k0601.doc/06/01/00 13
pbP (ti-1) Unit price of process input b
dpbP (ti) Unit price change of process input b
Decisions on market interaction (offer price and quantity, bid price) are made on an enterprise
level and based on distributed (every firm), primitive “learning” (“IF stimulus s THEN
response r” rules) and production requirements (bid quantity). Figure 5 depicts the decision
trees which underlie the adaptation rules (rules reflect bounded rationality).













Lower units by dqO %
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Increase unit price by dpB %
Rule Structure:
IF Stimulus s THEN Response r
Source: Adapted from Schlueter, C., and M. J. Shaw.  1998. An Organizational Ecosystems Simulator Applied to Electronic Commerce.
Proceedings of CIST/INFORMS April 1998 Conference held in Montreal, Canada.
Figure 5: Enterprise Agent—Decision Trees for Market Adaptation
Decision-making is based on rules, which determine the adaptive behavior of an enterprise
agent. As sellers, enterprise agents make offers and have to decide on price and quantity; as
buyers of inputs, they submit bids and make a decision on bid price. Decisions are made
simultaneously; no firm commits to its offer and bid prior to its competitors.
Process Agent Activities and Functions
For each core process, it is assumed that two inputs are needed to produce one unit of output
[QP = f(x1, x2)]. The relationship between inputs is such that output is limited by the most
scarce input [f(x1, x2) = min{aPx1, bPx2}—a Leontief case, as opposed to a Cobb-Douglas
function with substitutive factors].© 1999, 2000 CSL/CEF2k0601.doc/06/01/00 14
The effect of input expansion on the amount of output is assumed to be one with constant
returns to scale; thus, cost functions are linear, “which is often a reasonable assumption to
make about technological structures” (Varian 1984, 18):
QP (x1, x2, x3) = aP x1 + bP x2 + gP x3 (E-3)
x1 In-system or direct input type 1
x2 Direct input type 2
x3 Out-of-system input or in-direct input
aP InSystemNeed0 (name of variable used in the software code)
bP InSystemNeed1
gP OutSystemNeed
Each core process exhibits fixed and variable cost:
CP (QP) = CFIX + cVAR QP (E-4)
CFIX Process fixed cost (FixCost; i.e., depreciation and amortization)
cVAR Variable cost of process value added (CashNeed; i.e., production set up, talent
management)
Market Agent Activities and Functions
Each of the stages of the supply chain is linked with a market agent. As market agents
communicate with enterprises only and as enterprises might be 100% backwardly integrated
across several stages some market agents might be idle during simulation runs.
The most upstream market of the entire supply chain system is called the raw materials market,
the most downstream market is called the final good market and markets in between are also
referred to as intermediate good markets.
A market agent matches buyers’ bids and sellers’ offers, applying a pre-specified mechanism.
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Figure 6: Market and Enterprise Agent Interaction
Currently, a two-sided competitive sealed-bid auction mechanism has been implemented.
Kambil and van Heck provide an overview of different auction models and implications
(1996). Competitive markets in general have proven to create highly efficient results in
allocating scarce resources.  The mechanism chosen resembles a stock market.  The
marketplace agent collects offers and bids (units, unit price) from enterprise agents and sorts
them into two separate tables (offer-table and bid-table), with offers in ascending order and
bids in descending order.  Then a second column is created for each table, accumulating unit
volume for each price position such that any offer table field shows the maximum of what gets
offered at same row price, while any bid table field shows the maximum of what will be
bought at same row price.  Finally, a uniform price is set to be the lowest accepted bid,
maximizing exchange revenue (not transactions).
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Since all successful buyers pay the same market-clearing price, this institution is considered to© 1999, 2000 CSL/CEF2k0601.doc/06/01/00 16
create an impression of fairness (Kambil and van Heck 1996).
3 Implementation
Swarm proved to be a very appropriate tool to build simulation applications for the analysis of
supply chains.
13
In order to investigate emergent industry structures, a new simulation application had to be
developed and built. Non of the available Swarm-based simulators provided the functionality
required for organizational analysis, such as vertical integration and market coordination. The
resulting simulator is not just another application, but rather a new tool kit designed to
facilitate organizational analysis. It is a library of reusable supply chain modeling components
that enable rapid development of customized decision support tools. It features a few relevant,
yet simple building blocks (components/agents and rules/dependencies) that can be arranged to
quickly create complex scenarios without losing flexibility and ease of modifications. The
system is called ORECOS (ORganizational ECOsystems Simulator) (Schlueter and Shaw
1998). It takes advantages of key concepts in object-oriented development, such as inheritance
and polymorphism, to increase scalability and flexibility for adaptation and change.
Instances of enterprise types are actual agents employed in simulation runs.
In order to run a particular application, six input files are currently required, which shape a
specific experimental setting based on ORECOS system functionality: SuperSettings.data
(defines number of vertically related steps in the supply chain structure and relations),
MarketFile.data (specifies location of markets in step structure), EPTypes.data (defines
different types of enterprise agents), EPInstances.data (specifies enterprise agent instances
within enterprise agent type parameters), CPTypes.data (defines different types of core process
agents), and CPTypesVar.data (specifies randomization of enterprise adaptation). The system
architecture has been implemented and the system code written by Peter Bruhn, Christoph
Schlueter and Gek Woo Tan.
14
The functionality of the ORECOS system has been validated through a staged testing of its
components (Schlueter-Langdon 1999).
4 Experimental Design
The goal of the simulation experiments is to facilitate the identification of successful entry
strategies for emerging DIS industries. Two settings with different industry-level concentration
and process cost conditions have been created to reflect conditions in emerging online
information markets. Because of the choice of abstraction in the conceptual model and
                                                
13 Lin et al. provide a brief overview of how to use Swarm as a simulation platform (1999, 18-19) and how to
apply it to implement a (hierarchical) supply chain network model (20-23). Lin also provides a mapping of supply
chain and Swarm properties (21).
14 A first version of the software code is available in Bruhn (1997, Appendix). First simulation experiments and
results have been published in Schlueter and Shaw (1998).© 1999, 2000 CSL/CEF2k0601.doc/06/01/00 17
implementation limitations, simulation experiments will only share modest similarities with
online information markets.
Because the model is designed to investigate conditions in intermediate good markets or the
inner-workings of the production system only, complications for input and output of the
system have not been considered. Therefore, in both settings, demand for the final good is
increasing linear and supply of raw materials is unlimited.
A simulation experiment advances in time steps. For both scenarios, one time step has been
chosen to represent a one-month time period. Each simulation experiment or run is conducted
over 24 time steps or two years.
15 At each time step, firms adapt to market conditions as
explained in paragraph 2.3.2 (Agent Functions and Dependencies) and illustrated in Figure 5
(Enterprise Agent: Decision Trees for Market Adaptation). This decision process is
randomized in that values of unit and price change are drawn from a normal distribution with a
constant variance (e.g., a 5% change is implemented as ì = 5 with ó = 1).
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Figure 7: Two Industry Scenarios—Number of Firms and Industry-level Integration (Ii)
versus Industry-level Specialization (Is)
The scenario of industry-level integration (Ii) is two firms at stage 1, four firms at stage 2—
one backward integrated and one specialized enterprise for each input string, and two firms at
                                                
15 Two years may already be too long a time period considering that the DIS industry is still in its early phase of
the product life cycle, which is usually characterized by rapid product innovation and change of share distribution
(i.e., Klepper 1996).© 1999, 2000 CSL/CEF2k0601.doc/06/01/00 18
stage 3 (one backward integrated firm and a specialized one). Twelve firms have been added to
create the settings for the second scenario  of industry-level specialization (Is). While
conditions at stage 3 remain the same, specialized firms have been added to stages 1 and 2.
Because all integrated firms have been chosen to be 100% backward integrated, the condition
in intermediate good markets for scenario Ii, for example, is characterized by a constellation of
one seller facing two buyers between stages 1 and 2 and two sellers facing one buyer between
stages 2 and 3. 14 and 26 process agents are required  in order to implement the scenarios Ii
and Is respectively (see Appendix, Table A1).
Assumptions about cost functions are based specifically on observations of the market for
online information services and electronic publishing. Internet/Web technology has
significantly altered cost structures. In particular, modularity and compatibility have changed
scale and scope economies in IT implementations. In the simulator, economies of scale and
scope can be created on a process level through different combinations of fixed and variable
cost (CFIX, cVAR).
Scope advantages exist when one firm can produce multiple products more cheaply than single
firms can produce each product separately.
16 The actual values for selected parameters of
production functions and cost functions do reflect relative differences, however, in order to
keep the simulation simple, at the expense of true resemblance of electronic publishing
markets.
With “old” IT cost function values reflect the assumption that integrated firms enjoy a clear
cost advantage. Fixed cost and variable cost parameters of specialized firms are 25% higher
than those of integrated firms.
Furthermore, it is assumed that a scope advantage of 10% remains between integrated firms
using “old” IT and specialized firms using “new” IT.
Further details and values for all variables are provided and explained in Schlueter-Langdon
(1999, 152-157; see Appendix Tables A2 and A3).
For each of the two scenarios (Ii and Is) many runs have been executed. For each run, the cost
functions have been altered to reflect choices of IT (“old” vs. “new”). In order to test the
success of a specialized entry for both scenarios, profits of the most downstream (stage 3)
firms (Ri vs. Rs) have been measured and compared.
17 In a scenario of industry-level
specialization (20 firms in the industry) and availability of “new” IT, for example, the firm Rs
can be interpreted as an entrant that is using “new” IT to compete with the incumbent Ri. In
this scenario, rival Ri may still use “old” IT (such as a proprietary platform with high fixed
cost and low variable cost) or already “new” IT.
                                                
16 Scope economies provide an integration incentive if the production of more than two goods, firstly, depends on
the same proprietary know-how base, and, secondly, requires the same specialized indivisible assets as input (i.e.,
Teece 1980).
17 If losses are incurred and if cumulative losses exceed cash account balance, then a firm would drop out of the
simulation run, or, in other words, exit.© 1999, 2000 CSL/CEF2k0601.doc/06/01/00 19
5 Simulation Results and Discussion
A multi-step approach has been devised to start and maintain simulation runs (or steady state).
In order to create a “living” system in compliance with the specifications outlined in Section 4
(Experimental Design), the following features have been added sequentially:  First, a linear
system (no enterprise adaptation to market results) has been configured with every enterprise
agent producing output profitably. Second, adaptation and growth have been introduced.
In the setting of industry-level integration and “old” IT (upper left quadrant of Table 1) and
with enterprise decisions on units of output only (no price adjustments; either a unit increase of
5% or a decrease of 5% (ì = 5 with ó = 1, normal distribution), the most downstream
specialized firm (3s) did not survive a run of 24 time steps. A 5% increase in unit output per
time step would translate into an annual unit growth rate of about 80%. Given fallen DIS
prices, the growth rate in the simulation corresponds well with growth in DIS markets
(Schlueter-Langdon 1999, Figure 2D-4, 25). Because volatility appeared to be too high and the
rule-based adaptation mechanism not smooth enough, further experiments have been
conducted with a reduced rate of change of units of output and prices. A rate of +/- 2.5% has
been chosen. A 2.5% increase in unit output per time step would translate into an annual unit
growth rate of approximately 34% which is approximately half of the compound annual
growth rate of Internet host growth for the four years from end of 1994 to end of 1998
(Schlueter-Langdon 1999, Figure 2D-3, 25).
In the setting of industry-level specialization, when enterprise decisions are based on change of
units of output and unit price—price of input(s) (bids) and output (offers)—and specialized
firms use “new” IT and integrated firms employ “old” IT, the specialized firm (3s) tends to be
more profitable than its integrated rival. Despite lower process cost resulting from scope
advantages through integration, specialization appears to be at least as successful, if not more,
than integration in the scenario of industry-level specialization.
Figure 8 depicts the aggregated results of a series of ten randomly selected runs for the third
stage firms (D9s4-0 to D9s4-9; each for 24 time steps and for the first 12 time steps; 3i =
integrated third stage firm, 3s = specialized third stage firm; Figure A1 in the Appendix shows
the results of a single, random run).
18
                                                
18 All variables and initial conditions were the same across all runs, except for the seed used to generate the
random numbers within a run. All initial conditions and the value of the seeds used to generate the random
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Figure 8: Summary of Results
After 24 time steps, the specialized firm is profitable in four out of ten runs versus three out of
ten for its integrated rival (upper left diagram in Figure 8). Because 24 time steps, or the
equivalent of two years, may be too long a time period for the infancy stage of a product life
cycle, results after 12 time steps of the same runs have also been considered. After the first 12
time steps, the specialized firm is profitable in seven out of ten runs and the integrated one in
five out of ten (lower left diagram in Figure 8). While both firms have been profitable in the
same run four out of ten times and unprofitable in two out of ten cases at time step 12, the
values deteriorate to one and four out of ten respectively at time step 24. These results suggest
that, in this scenario, the industry itself may become less attractive over time. These
suppositions are confirmed by the development of cumulative profits. Over 24 time steps, the
specialized enterprise agent is profitable in six out of ten runs versus three out of ten for its
integrated rival (upper right diagram in Figure 8). After 12 time steps, both firms show
cumulative profits in seven out of ten runs, however, the total net cumulative results (profits)
for the specialized firm exceed the one of its integrated competitor by approximately 245%;
lower right diagram in Figure 8. Also, cumulative results appear to support the conclusion
drawn from point-in-time results that the industry, in this scenario, is becoming less attractive
over time. While both firms show cumulative profits in the same run in five out of ten cases
and losses in only one run after 12 time steps, these values change to two out of ten and three
out of ten after 24 time steps. Even total net cumulative results, which have been profits after
12 time steps, turn into big losses after 24 time steps. Nonetheless, losses of the specialized
enterprise agent are still more than 40% lower than those of its integrated rival.
Statistical analysis reveals only week evidence that the performance of the 3s-firm is better
than that of its integrated rival 3i. Assuming that observations are values of random normal
variables, a t test for paired samples is applied (as 3s and 3i interact through the same markets;© 1999, 2000 CSL/CEF2k0601.doc/06/01/00 21
observations are not independent). For a = 0.05 and H20 (profits/losses are the same) and H2A
(3s is more successful), t12 (= 1.236; cumulative results for the first 12 time steps) and t24 (=
0.747; cumulative results after 24 time steps) are less than tC (= 1.812; t distribution, 10
degrees of freedom, single-sided test) (Bleymüller and Gehlert 1988, 124). Therefore, H20
cannot be rejected. In other words, the test suggests that financial results of 3i and 3s do not
differ. Given that there is a bias toward 3i success, because 3i enjoys production cost
advantages as shown in Table 4-7, specialization or specialized entry appears to be a viable
strategy in this particular industry scenario.
For a = 0.2 and the same H20 and H2A, t12 > tC (= 0.879; t distribution, 10 degrees of freedom,
single-sided test) (Bleymüller and Gehlert 1988, 124). Therefore, H2A is accepted. In other
words, with a type-1 error of a = 0.2, financial results of 3s are better than the ones of its
integrated rival. For a = 0.25, t24 > tC (= 0.7).
The simulation results conform well with the observation and analysis of DIS markets
(Schlueter-Langdon 1999). In DIS markets, the largest and most successful firms have been
initially highly vertically integrated. America Online, for example, has built strong vertically
integrated competencies, which have been advantageous in becoming and remaining the
product innovation leader. Major acquisitions and alliances have facilitated internalization of
these competencies such as the purchase of ANS for $35 million in November 1994. Less
integrated rivals, such as Delphi, fell behind the integrated leaders, while others, such as
Europe Online, failed outright.
With the emergence of the Web standards and popularity of Web software application and
information systems many new firms have entered digital interactive services (Schlueter-
Langdon 1999, Figure 2D-7, 29). At the same time service offerings have been expanded
beyond online information and electronic publishing markets into other vertical markets such
as financial services (i.e., E*Trade brokerage, Bank24 retail banking), travel services (i.e., MS-
Expedia and Travelocity travel stores) and many other consumer goods categories (i.e.,
Amazon book retailer, CDNow music CD retailer).© 1999, 2000 CSL/CEF2k0601.doc/06/01/00 22
Appendix
Firm Structure Supply Chain Structure (Number of













p11 p21 p12 p22 EAIs PAIs EAIs PAIs
Manufacturer A p11 1 1 4 4
Manufacturer B p21 1 1 4 4
DAi 100 1 2 1 2 Distributor A
DAs
p12
1 1 4 4
DBi 100 1 2 1 2 Distributor B
DBs
p22
1 1 4 4
Ri 100 100 1 4 1 4 Retailer
Rs
p13, p23
1 2 1 2
Total Number of Enterprise and Process Agent Instances 8 14 20 26
Table A1: Supply Chain and Firm Structures
Legend
pxy Process type, string x and stage y (current implementation: 2 strings and 3 stages)
i Integrated firm
s Specialized/focused firm
EAI Enterprise agent instance (actual enterprise agent)
PAI Process agent instance
Production Processes Coefficient
p11 p12 p13 P21 P22 P23
aP 1 2 2 1 2 2
Table A2: Values for Production Functions—Example
Process Cost
p11 p12 p13 P21 P22 P23
State of IT
CFIX cVAR
DAi 9 2.25 13.5 1.8
DBi 27 1.8 18 1.8








Rs 20 2 20 2
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Figure A1: One Run—Industry-level Specialization, 3rd Stage, Specialized Firm 3s
versus Integrated Firm (3i)© 1999, 2000 CSL/CEF2k0601.doc/06/01/00 24
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